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As the interests of our people become more diversified and their
industries grow more complex and assume greater proportions and
variety of form, the demands upon the government necessarily increase.
But add to the remarkable growth in scope and variety of interests
possessed by our people to-day as compared with the situation even
half a century ago, the increased tendency toward co-ordination and
co-operation, not only in private but as between public and private
business as well-the passing of the doctrines of laissez faire and unre-
stricted freedom of the individual as axioms of economics and political
and legal theory-and we add enormously to the public burden. This
is particularly true in matters of legislation; there all these considera-
tions apply directly. In order to legislate intelligently and in detail,
the members of Congress individually must know more things and
knowthem more accurately and intimately than is humanly possible.
The result has been that Congress has increasingly delegated to others
the duty of doings things which in the inception of the government
it might well have done itself.
How far may Congress or the state legislature under a state con-
stitution modeled after the federal pattern go in this respect? How
far may they delegate to others duties in the laying down of new rules
intended to be obligatory upon all who come within their cope? For
whenever a new rule of this type has been laid down an act essentially
legislative in character has been done.'
In the decisions of the courts upon the question of the delegation of
legislative functions three things are almost invariably done: First,
there is unanimous agreement that legislative powers cannot be dele-
gated by Congress or by the legislature; second, although the judges
rely upon the dicta of other courts and scarcely analyze the terms used,
the delegation is usually permitted; and third, there seems to be a
'Field, J., in dissent, Sinking Fund Cases (1879) 99 U. S. 7oo, 761, 25 L. Ed.
496, 516:
"The distinction between a judicial and a legislative Act is well defined. The
one determines what the law is, and what the rights of the parties are, with
reference to transactions already had; the other prescribes what the law shall
be in future cases under it."
Cf. Taylor v. Place (1856)4 R. I. 324; Sminth v. Strother (1885) 68 Cal. 194,
8 Pac. 852.
"Essentially, the promulgation of administrative orders or ordinances is legisla-
tive in character." 2 Willoughby, Constitution, sec. 742.
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growing tendency in the decisions to give prominence to the supposed
"necessity" of the case, even while admitting-unnecessarily, perhaps
-that this delegation appears contrary to the letter if not to the spirit
of the Constitution.
2
Such a situation is unsatisfactory. The Constitution must be upheld
and even great apparent necessity should not lead to shifts and evasions.
On the other hand, we should not follow the vague reasoning of many
of the courts nor be content with their faulty analysis nor be misled
by the ambiguity and confusion of their terminology.
It is interesting to note how often in the development of Anglo-
American law the courts have reached a conclusion quite in accord-
ance with the duty then resting upon them of balancing the interests
involved; yet when the court is pressed to formulate the grounds of
the decision a reason is given which is applicable neither logically nor
historically.4 When later judges decide new phases of the same ques-
tion they are apt to be led astray by a too literal application of the
supposed reason offered for the former decision. This tendency seems
inevitable in a system where busy judges, harassed by the pressure of
many cases, must formulate the law to such an extent as they do with
us.
5l
Our Constitution was framed with the idea that the first principles
of government required a separation of legislative, executive and
judicial powers. The framers feared tyranny, and the theories of
Montesquieu were accepted by them and by the courts as the final word
of political wisdom. 6 Does this doctrine of the separation of the
powers of government stand in the way of attempted delegations by the
legislature of legislative functions? In answer it might be said that
the theory of the separation of powers as applied by the framers of the
'Railroad Commission v. Central of Ga. Ry. (igog) i7o Fed. 225, 238, 95 C.
C..A. 130; State v. Public Service Commission (sg7, Mo.) 194 S. W. 287.
But for a somewhat different connotation given to adverbs similar to "essen-
tially" as qualifying "legislative," see infra, cases cited in notes 92 to 95, and
pp. 920, 92I.
'See criticism of analysis on such questions by Edmund M. Parker, Executive
Judgments and Executive Legislation (i9o7) 2o HAv. L. REv. 116. For a dis-
cussion of the extent to which misuse of terms leads to confusion in thought,
see Prof. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Same Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning (1913) 23 YAIZ LAw JouRNAL, 16, 29. Compare terms
used in cases cited in notes "2-96 post.
'See articles by Prof. Jeremiah Smith on Surviving Fictions (1917-18) 27
YA=E LAW JouRNAL, 147, 153, n 41, 317. Professor Smith quotes Justice Holmes
as saying "that judges know which way to decide a good deal sooner than they
know how to give the reason why."
'Prof. John C. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (19o9) 215-231,
465-512, 545-550, 628-636.
"'The theory was accepted not . . . as a scientific theory but as a legal rule."
Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, Principles of the Administrative Law of the U. S.
(,9o5) 31.
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government did not forbid transference of power from the legislative
body to another branch of the government on the ground that it would
be a mixing of functions. Historically there had never been a govern-
ment in which legislative, executive and judicial functions-or at least
two of them-were not united in the same branch; and when Montes-
quieu wrote and when the Constitution of the United States was
framed, there was no government in existence which did not actually
mingle even the powers themselves and combine them in one person or
body or vest branches of the government with a combination of two of
them. Montesquieu had in mind a political theory which at that time
was nowhere realized -in fact7 The framers of the Constitution gave
some slight thought to theory in the separation of powers, but more to
matters of political expediency, and the reported debates of the Con-
vention show that the members consciously mixed powers and func-
tions which in their nature were legislative, judicial and executive, s
7 "From these facts [in regard to the British Constitution], by which
Montesquieu was guided, it may be clearly inferred, that in saying, 'there can
be no liberty,* where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or body of magistrates;' or, 'if the power of judging, be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers,' he did not mean that those depart-
ments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each
other. His meaning, as his words import, and still more conclusively as
illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that
where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of
a free constitution are subverted." James Madison, Federalist, No. 47.
",That no separation of powers, based upon the nature of the different
goveimrental powers, was ever intended to be inserted in our organic law,
would convincingly appear from a most cursory perusal of the debates in the
constitutional conventions . . . . Familiar with the theory of Montesquieu,
but unfamiliar with any supposed possibility of classifying powers according to
their intrinsic nature, they vested legislative power, meaning thereby only the
power of enacting general laws for the entire government, in the legislature;
judicial power, meaning thereby only the power of determining and protecting
the rights of persons under the constitution and constitutional laws, in the
courts; and executive power, meaning thereby the power of seeing that the laws
are faithfully executed, in the executive department. Next they considered . . .
other important powers which they thought their government in the course of
its existence would probably be called upon to exercise. They did not enter
into a philosophical discussion as to whether such a power was legislative,
executive or judicial in its nature, but deliberated in which one or more of the
departments already established by them the given power could with greatest
propriety and safety be vested. Certain governmental powers . . . they vested
in a governmental agency specially created for the purpose, and which did not
form part of either of the three great departments.
"Powers which would require promptitude, activity, decision, or unity of plan,
if of sufficient importance, they vested in the executive. For instance, for such
reason, they made the President . . . commander-in-chief of the army and
navy. . . . They vested the pardoning power in the executive. . . . They did
not waste time in discussing whether the power of receiving ambassadors could
be considered executive, legislative, or judicial; . . . they vested the power in
the President. . . . They.vested the treaty-making power in the executive, .
subjected . . . to the deliberative assent of two-thirds of the Senate . .
"The general clause, vesting legislative power in the legislature, vests therein
only the power of enacting general laws for the entire government. Besides
this, the constitutions specially vest many other powers in the legislature, such
as the power of impeachment . . ."
William Bondy, Separation of Governmental Powers (1896) 5 Columbia
Studies in Hist. Econ. & Public -Law, No. 2, p. 74 et seq.
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and as freely defended the mixing on the ground that the greatest
security results from a partial participation of each branch of the
government in the powers of the other branches.9 The separation as
judged by the nature of the powers was not intended to be complete,
and in practice such a complete separation would be inadvisable if not
impossible.10 The effect of a separation of the powers of government
by the Constitution would, therefore, seem rather to be that no power
definitely assigned to any branch could be considered as belonging to
or delegable to any other; but as to every function not so assigned, it
might well have been considered as delegable at the will of the legisla-
tive branch.11
A second reason sometimes suggested for the non-delegability of
legislative functions 2 is that each department of the government being
itself a delegate could not, therefore, delegate. This idea finds
expression in the maxim delegatus non potest delegare,13 and it is
entitled to some respect as a broad assertion of principle if rightly
limited and understood. As an exact and universal statement, it is
9Federalist, Nos. 47, 48, 5o, 51.
""The separation is not, and, from the nature of things cannot be total."
Beall v. Beall (185o) 8 Ga. 21o. Cf. Paddell v. City of N. Y. ('9o8) 211 U. S.
446, 29 Sup. Ct 139, 53 L. Ed. 275; State v. Crosby (19o4) 92 Minn. 176, 99
N. W. 636:
"The marked tendency of legislation in recent years, not only in this state,
but in other states, has been, to a large degree, to break away from the theory
of three separate and independent departments of government . . ."
Cf. Minneapolis, St. P. etc. Ry. v. Railroad Commission (19o8) 136 Wisc.
146, 116 N. W. 9o5, 17 L. R. A. N. S. 821.
"No one will assert at present that the separation of powers . .. is essential
to liberty. . . . It is a practical device existing for practical ends . . . the
division of labor . . . a mere specialization." Dean Roscoe Pound, Spurious
Interpretation (1907) 7 COLUMBIA L. REV. 379, 384.
'"Whenever a power is not distinctly either legislative, executive or judicial,
and is not by the constitution confided to a designated department of the govern-
ment, the mode of its exercise . . .must necessarily be under the control of
the legislature." Bondy, op. cit. 8o.
But note that the courts have applied the doctrine of the separation of powers
as limiting the kind of functions which may be delegated to any branch of the
government, limiting such delegation to functions not inconsistent with the
nature of the principal duties of that department. While according to that view
courts do not possess all functions judicial in nature, still they should refuse to
accept and should be denied functions not judicial in nature unless given directly
by the constitution. Western Union v. Myatt (1899) 98 Fed. 335; Bondy, op.
cit. 83; Appeal of Norwalk St.,Ry. Co. (1897) 69 Conn. 576, 38 AtI. 708; Village
of Fairview v. Giffee (i9o5) 73 Ohio St. 183.
"The principle of the separation of powers does not prevent the legislative
delegation . . . of a considerable ordinance-making power." Willoughby, Con-
stitution, sec. 742.
'State v. Public Serv. Coin. (1917) 194 S. W. 287.
"See the very sarcastic note by Bentham on this maxim: Principles of Morals
and Legislation (Oxford ed. 1879) 13, n., i Works, 6, n.
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false. Many delegates cannot further delegate the duty intrusted to
them because it is to be personally exercised by the delegate himself.
This is true of the judicial acts of a judge: he may be selected to try
the case before him because of his personal and professional qualifica-
tions, and he cannot pass that duty to another. Many delegates cannot
further delegate their functions because they are agents or mandataries
for the purpose of doifig a special act-such as sitting as a judge.
With the legislature it is different. Of course the legislature should
not delegate the function that is intrusted to its immediate personal
care, but by the very nature of its being a delegating or duty-assign-
ing body, it can delegate to others the power both to do acts it could
not itself do, and also the power to do acts which it might well have
done itself.14 Therefore the legislative branch being inherently a
duty-assigning branch may, in the teeth of the maxim, assign such
duties and functions to others as it is not, for some other reason, pro-
hibited from assigning or they from receiving, even though itself a
body of delegated and even limited powers ;15 without such ability the
power would be barren and incomplete.18
The true limitation on the power of Congress or of a legislature to
delegate functions must be found in the fact that the function
attempted to be delegated has been intrusted by the Constitution to one
of the departments of government, there to be personally exercised;
as applied to legislative duties, these functions are intrusted to the
personal care of the legislative bodyY This is the familiar doctrine
of mandate as applied to governmental affairs.1 s The limits of this
" "Congress may certainly delegate to others powers which the legislature
may rightfully exercise itself." Wayrnan v. Southard (1825) Wheat 1, 42, 6
L. Ed. 253, 262. See Bondy, op. cit. ch. viii.
""Whatever inherent jurisdiction a magistrate had in right of his office, he
could transfer by mandate to another proper person. That is to say, a magis-
trate could delegate his inherent jurisdiction, but could not sub-delegate his
delegated jurisdiction." Brinton Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional
Legislation (Phila. 1893) ch. xi, div. C, p. 12I.
"But note the contra view of John A. Fairlie, National Administration of the
U. S. (N. Y. 1905) 23:
"United States judges have held, ... that Congress may delegate the power
to make rules and regulations, and, . . . that this does not constitute a delega-
tion of legislative power. These views would seem to be logically inconsistent
with each other. . . . For Congress possesses only legislative power, and it
would seem that any delegation of power by Congress must be a delegation of
legislative power."
' "The assumed incapacity to delegate is implied, as a necessary result, from
the fact that, in our system of government, the power to make the laws is lodged
in our senate and general assembly; that a consequent obligation rests upon
them to exercise the function with which they are intrusted!' Paul v, Gloucester
,(1888) 50 N. J. L 585, 593, 15 At. 272, 276.
'The doctrine of mandate as applied-to governmental duties was known in
America at the time of the framing of the Constitution through the writings
of Vattel and others. See Varnum's Pamphlet on Trevett v. Weeden (1786,
R. I.) 24, 25, 26; Vanhorn v. Dorran e (1795) 2 DalL. 308; Federalist, No. 78;
Marbury v. Madison (i8o3) i Cranch, 137, 175 et seq.; Luther v. Borden (1849)
7 How. I, 66.
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doctrine would seem to be that no department could avoid the
personal exercise of any function lodged with it by the Constitution
unless it appeared by the terms or circumstances of the delegation that
the function was to be exercised either by that body or by some other
at its discretion. The exception does not apply to the judicial branch;
even though a given function were assigned to it contingently, it could
not delegate it because the judiciary is not a duty-assigning branch of
the government. The exception does apply with full force to the
legislative department which by the very nature of its being must
assign functions to others.
The problem in relation to the delegation of legislative duties by
Congress or the legislature is this: What is it that the Constitution
requires of it as a personal duty? Second, how far have the courts
already established a rule binding upon us by their precedents? So
far as the Constitution originally left Congress free and so far as the
courts have not specifically foreclosed the question, the free power of
delegation undoubtedly exists.
Consider first the mandate given by the Constitution to Congress.
It is found in article i, section i of the Constitution of the United
States and provides:
"All legislative powers herein granted, shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives."
If we construe those words standing alone they would be consistent
with a very broad power of delegation of functions and duties legis-
lative in their nature. For it must be conceded that the vesting of a
power over a certain field does not of itself imply a duty to do person-
ally every act necessary to be done under that power. To assert this
would place a limit on the free exercise-and perhaps the most effica-
cious exercise-of that power. Webster's New International Diction-
ary gives, among other definitions for power:
"The possession of sway or controlling influence over others; con-
trol; authority; command; influence; ascendency, whether personal,
social, or political."
Paraphrasing the above section and using any one of the suggested
equivalents in place of the word power, it could scarcely be contended
that this section standing alone forbids the delegation of legislative
functions or duties as such, so long as Congress retains the control or
authority over such acts; and indeed, in this sense, Congress cannot
delegate its legislative power because that power, being conferred by
the superior might of the Constitution, would remain in Congress sub-
ject to be resumed at will by that body in spite of any attempts it might
make to delegate it.
As previously suggested, the question is: How far has the Con-
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stitution intended this power over legislation to be personally effectu-
ated by Congress; how far is that body, in furtherance of the exercise
of the power, required to lay down in detail new rules for the future;
in other words, how far is it required to do every act and perform
every function legislative in nature which is necessary to make effective
the power itself? Obviously the two things are not the same: the
conferring of power or control or authority does not of itself imply a
duty' personally to perform the detailed act. In fact, as suggested
above, if the exercise of the legislative power does entail the personal
performance by Congress of all the minutiae of legislation in all cases,
Congress is pitiably hampered in the carrying out of the very power
supposed to be conferred by the Constitution. This idea, in one form
or another, has been repeatedly expressed by our courts and text-
writers.19
What, then, does the legislative power mean? Broadly speaking,
there are but two functions of government: i. The choosing and
adopting of policies. 2. The carrying out of these policies through the
making and enforcing of detailed rules. But this broad division
probably does not correspond with the facts of any government known
to history. The first is, functionally considered, "law-creative" or
legislative. Yet it does not correspond with our division of functions
under the Constitution because it would include the policy-initiating,
diplomatic, and treaty-making powers of the President.20 But the
power over this function-the power of ultimately choosing the policy
to be adopted-is the heart and the essence of legislative power; and
this is the legislative power given to Congress over those subjects
committed to its care, and is the essence of legislative power generally.
The second function is administrative; it includes the principal
activities of the executive aside from his political functions, and also
".As civilization becomes more complex . . . the government . . . must
abandon the system of unconditional commands and resort to conditional com-
mands which vest in the administrative officers large powers of a discretionary
character." Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, Principles of the Administrative Law of
the U. S. (i9o5) 324.
"Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and
from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officers the
duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the power
of Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount but to declaring
that the plenary power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could
not be efficaciously exerted." Buttfield v. Stranahan (1904) 192 U. S. 470, 496.
". .. Unless the Legislature could pass an act outlining the governing prin -
ciples in somewhat general terms, and leave the railroad commission to fill in the
details, the power of the Legislature on the subject would be practically useless
and impossible of execution." Lumpkin, J., in Southern Ry. v. Melton (i9o9)
133 Ga. 277, 65 S. E. 665, 668. Cf. Georgia R. R. v. Smith (i883) 7o Ga. 694.
"Compare Locke's suggested division into legislative, executive and federative.
His idea of federative combines the war powers and all relations with foreign
states, which we to a large extent have combined in the executive branch under
the power of the President. Civil Government, ch. i2.
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the judicial activities. 21 This administrative field includes all acts
legislative in nature beyond the adoption of the broad policy, so that
in this sense the legislature too performs essentially administrative
functions when it works out details in the application of the policy.
Thus, the legislative power, while concerning itself with new rules
for the future, has as its true and proper subject-matter the broad
policy which it declares. All details in the application of the policy
may be delegated, though these details may involve the exercise of
discretion and a choice between policies subordinate to the broad policy
of the legislature. Therefore, if article i, section i stood alone as an
expression of the duty of Congress, that body need only indicate the
policy to be pursued, and it will have exercised the power conferred
upon it. The further legislative acts of laying down in detail the rule
to be followed might well be done by Congress, or at its option, dele-
gated to any person or body whose possible activities are not expressly
or impliedly circumscribed by the Constitution. For instance, these
legislative functions and duties could not be conferred upon the courts
provided for in the Constitution, but they might well be conferred upon
some part of the executive branch because historically the executive
has always had some legislative duties to perform and the Constitution
puts upon him the duty of participating in certain legislative matters.
The executive is more interested than any other branch of the govern-
ment in the form, the machinery and the details of the law, because
these matters have a bearing upon its practical and efficient execution.
Especially may the legislative power be vested in other functionaries
or boards anomalous in character, brought into being to give expert-
ness and length to the legislative arm in the application of its policies
through detailed rules. Such bodies would not be prohibited from
exercising their duties and functions through any implied inhibition
growing out of the doctrine of the separation of powers. 22 This con-
struction is strengthened by consideration of the provisions of article
i, section 8, paragraph 18 of the Constitution and the construction
placed thereon by the Supreme Court of the United States.2 3 That
paragraph provides v
'For even though judges do "legislate," as is often asserted, they presumably
operate only within the broad policy of the law as previously existing or as
declared by the legislative arm of the government and as recognized by the court.
Cf. note 5, supra.
[See John E. Young, The Law as an Expression of Community Ideals and the
Lawmaking Functions of Courts (917) 27 YAI. LAw JoURNA, i.-Ed.]
'People v. Provines (1868) 34 Calif. 520. Cf. A. A. Berle, Jr., The Expansion
of American Administrative Law (1917) 30 HARv. L. REV. 430, 441.
Chief Justice White, speaking of the above clause and the interpretation put
thereon by Chief Justice Marshall, says:
"That provision . . .gave legislative power to adopt every appropriate means
to give effect to the powers expressly given. In terms it was pointed out that
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"The Congress shall have the power . . . to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the forego-
ing powers."
Thorough investigations by Congress through its committees, and
the working out of minute details of laws are administrative functions
which Congress has heretofore largely assumed,--and not improperly
so long as it can effectively handle them. But Congress can as
properly delegate these functions, retaining to itself only the control
and direction of policies. In fact this becomes the duty of Congress
whenever it finds that these functions can be more efficiently performed
by some other person or body. In such case under the provisions of
article i, section 8, paragraph 1S, it becomes the duty of Congress to
delegate the making of detailed rules to an expert board or to an
individual having the necessary skill and information. In doing this
Congress is "making laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into effect the foregoing powers." And this is the true point
of connection between "necessity" and the power to delegate legisla-
tive functions.2'
We should further note the bearing of other parts of article i of the
federal Constitution on the power of Congress. Section 4, paragraph
2 requires Congress to meet each year; section 5, paragraph 4 forbids
either house deserting the other in the performance of its duties.
Under section 7, paragraph i, revenue bills must originate in the
House, and the clear implication is that in completed form they must
be passed by Congress itself. Paragraph 2 of the same section further
limits the acts that may become laws. All these provisions indicate
this broad authority was not stereotyped as of any particular time, but endured,
thus furnishing a perpetual and living sanction to the legislative authority within
the, limits of a just discretion, enabling it to take into consideration the chang-
ing wants and demands .of society and to adopt provisions appropriate to meet
every situation which it was deemed required to be provided for. In fact, the
rulings . . .were all summed up in the following passage, which ever since
has been one of the principal tests by which to determine the scope of the implied
power of congress over subjects committed to its legislative authority: 'We
admit, as all must admit, that the powers of government are limited, and that
its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the
Constitution must allow the national legislature that discretion, with respect to
the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which
will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner
most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."' First National Bank v.
Fellows (1917) 244 U. S. 416, 419, 6i L. Ed. 1233, 1237.
'See cases note i9, supra; also State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. (igi) 56
Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R. A. N. S. 639; State v. Public Serv. Com. (1917,
Mo.) 194 S. W. 287; U. S. v. Grintaud (IH) 22 U. S. 5o6, 55 L. Ed. 563;
State v. Briggs (x9o4) 45 Ore. 366, 77 Pac. 750. In all the above cases necessity
is spoken of as a justification for delegations-the necessity of resorting to some
delegation to legislate effectively.
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that Congress must give its personal attention to its work, and they
make it clear that Congress may never by a "lex regid'25 turn over
bodily to another the entire power of legislation. Congress must pro-
mulgate its policies as laws; in the case of revenue laws they must
be worked out in detail, but in all other cases it is the power that Con-
gress must personally execute. No legislation, therefore, can take
place without the direction of Congress; and the laying down of
directions by that body meeting in its legislative halls constitutes the
exercise of the legislative power intrusted to it. All this is in no wise
inconsistent with the views indicated, and this legislative power may
still be exercised with relation to section 8, paragraph 18, of article i.
Congress may not delegate the choosing of policies nor the duty of
formally enacting the policy into law, but it may formulate that policy
as broadly and with as much or as little detail as it sees proper and it
may delegate the duty of working out the details and the application
of the policy to the situation it was intended to meet. The rule, there-
fore,--so far as there may be said to be a rule against the delegation of
legislative powers-is not a prohibition against delegations of legisla-
tive functions or of the duty to do acts legislative in their nature after
Congress has laid down the broad rule; but it is a prohibition of the
attempted subdelegation of the very power itself or the duty of meet-
ing in annual session and declaring the national will in some form of
enactment in the general laws. As to when the necessity for delega-
tion exists, the decision rests with the legislative body-a discretion not
to be disturbed by the courts except in clear cases of abuse.2  The
very fact of the separation of powers should make courts more careful
in this respect.
The cases upon the question of the delegation of legislative func-
tions and powers are numerous, but as expressed by the courts them-
selves:
"The line has not been exactly drawn, which separates those
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature
itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be
made, and power given those who are to act under such general pro-
vision to fill up the details.1
27
' Inst. lib. I, tit 2, par. 6; Gaii. inst. I. 5, Dig. lib. I, tit 4, 1. 4.
"When we recur to the fact that the power of eminent domain has been
delegated to railroad and other corporations without challenge; that the impor-
tant power of taxation and all the powers of local government have, for more
than three generations, been delegated in our state, we are admonished not to
be too confident in asserting where the precise limitation is upon the competency
of the legislature to delegate.powers of government
'We must be careful, therefore, how, in the absence of express injunction or
clear implication, we strip a co-ordinate branch of the state government of the
right to give expression to its will, in the form of law, within its own depart-
ment" Paul v. Gloucester (i888) 5o N. J. 585, 594, 15 AtI. 272, 276.
See notes 99 and Ioo, infra.
'In re Griner (1863) i6 Wisc. 423, 437.
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"Touching the question of the delegation of legislative powers, the
almost infinite variety of detail and circumstance and of the laws
intended to meet them have led to an almost equal variety of judicial
decision and utterance which, taken in the abstract, cannot be harmon-
ized."'
28
Thus, while there has been an inclination toward a liberal and favor-
able construction of such statutes, there is at the same time a tendency
to attempt to put the decision upon some easily conceded ground such
as the power to make a complete act effective upon the happening of a
contingency, 9 or upon the ascertainment of a fact by the chief execu-
tive, as in the case of The Aurora v. United States.
30 This has been
done even in cases where some warping of the true situation may have
been necessary in order to make applicable the principle thus stated.
31
It has been phrased:
"Although the legislature cannot delegate its powers to make a law
yet it can delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law may depend.1
3 2
Dicta also arise from cases where a certain class of things is prohibited
generally under a proper exercise of the police power, and some officer
or board is empowered to determine when cases do or do not fall
within the general prohibition.3 3 With such situations it is not
intended to deal in this article. We are here interested in those
decisions which concede the power to delegate a rule-making or ordi-
nance-making function to executive officers or administrative boards,
and with that class of acts which have been ambiguously described by
the courts as administrative acts of a legislative nature.
3 '
A challenge to the whole theory attempted to be set forth herein has
been sounded in a series of cases of which Dowling v. Lancashire Ins.
Co.3 5 is typical. It was there held that the legislature might not con-
stitutionally empower the commissioner of insurance to
State v. Public Serv. Com. (1917, Wash.) 162 Pac. 523, 526.
"Hudspeth v. Swayze (1914) 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Ati. 78o; State v. Parker
(1854) 26 Vt 357.
(1813) 7 Cranch, 382, 3 L. Ed. 378.
Note the minority opinion in Field v. Clark (1892) 143 U. S. 649, 12 SUp. Ct
495, 36 L. Ed. 294.
'Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649; Locke's Appeal (873) 72 Pa. St 491.
" Union Bridge Co. v. U. S. (1907) 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct 367, 51 L. Ed.
523; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. U. S. (i9Wo) 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct 356, 54
L. Ed. 435.
"State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. (1911) 56 Fla. 617; Chicago & N. W. Ry.
v. Dey (i888) 35 Fed. 866. As showing the uncertain meaning of "administra-
tive" as applied to legislative functions, see note o6, and p. 921, post.
"(M8f6) 92 Wisc. 63, 65 N. W. 738, 31 L. R. A. 112.
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"prepare, approve and adopt a printed form in blank of a contract or
policy of fire insurance together with such provisions, agreements or
conditions as may be endorsed thereon or added thereto, and form a
part of such contract or policy; and such form shall, as near as the
same can be made applicable, conform to the type and form of the New
York standard fire insurance policy" on the ground that the act "fails
to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should con-
tain, so that it could be put in use . . .without the determination
of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated."
The court held that the act was incomplete and uncertain until the
commissioner acted. As
"a discretion was reposed in the commissioner as to the form of the
policy which embodied the substance of the contract, and which was to
have the sanction and the force of law," that "the effect, clearly, was
to transfer to him bodily the legislative power of the state on that
subject." Continuing, the court says: "Within the limits prescribed,
he was to prepare just such a policy or contract as, in his judgment
and discretion, would meet the legal exigencies of the case, and no one
could certainly predict what the result of his action might be. It was
not to be published, as laws are required to be, or to be approved by
the governor. It was to be filed in the office of the insurance commis-
sioner, instead of being deposited in the office of the secretary of state,
and its use was to be enforced by the penal sanction of the act. He
was not required by the act to perform any mere administrative or
executive duty, or to determine any matter of fact for the purpose of
executing or carrying the act into effect. The result of all the cases
on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and pro-
visions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee
or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law,
in all its details, in praesenti, but which may be left to take effect in
futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event."5 8
For this decision the court cites and relies largely upon Field V.
Clark and the cases therein cited. That case, it should be remembered,
sustained, so far as our question is concerned, the section of the Tariff
Act of i89o which provided that:
"Whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the
government of any country producing sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and
hides, raw and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes duties or other
exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States,
wCf. the following cases in accord, dealing with powers conferred on boards
of health: Anderson v. Manchester Fire Assurance Co. (I895) 59 Minn. 182, 63
'N. W. 241; DONeil v. American Fire Ins. Co. (1895) 166 Pa. St 72, 3o AtL
943; State v. Burdge (897) 95 Wisc. 390, 37 L. R. A. 157, 62 Am. St Rep. 123,
7o N. W. 347. In the case I st cited the competency of such legislation as a
proper exercise of the police power seems to have been the real question in the
mind of the court.
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which, in view of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses . . .
into the United States, he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty to sus-
pend, by proclamation to that effect, . . . the free introduction of
such sugar . .. , the production of such country, for such time as he
shall deem just, and in such case and during such suspension duties
shall be levied . . . as follows :"
Detailed provisions as to such suspension duties follow. The court
in Field v. Clark later says:
"That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President
is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and main-
tenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."
After holding that, as interpreted by the court, this was not a delega-
tion of legislative power to the President, the court proceeds:
"'The true distinction' as Judge Ranney speaking for the Supreme
Court of Ohio has well said, 'is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.' Cincinnati W.
& Z. Ry. Co. v. Clinton County Comrs. i Ohio St. 88. In Moers v.
Reading, 21 Pa. 2o2, the language of the court was: 'Half the statutes
on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion of
some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for executing them. But it cannot
be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.'
So, in Locke's App., 72 Pa. 491: 'To assert that a'law is less than a
law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob
the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare when-
ever a, law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet fully developed,
or to things future and impossible to know . . . The Legislature
cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which
the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny
this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many
things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which can-
not be known to the law making power, and, must, therefore, be a sub-
ject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation.'"
That these statements are not inconsistent with the decision of the
Wisconsin court may be conceded. It must be remembered, however,
that the decision in Field v. Clark was in favor of the validity of the
provision in question; that the above statements were not necessary to
the decision of the case before the United States Supreme Court, and
that the situation immediately presented to Justice Harlan was one
which as interpreted by him8 7 did not involve a question of real dele-
gation. On this point he says:
'Note that Justice Lamar, Chief Justice Fuller concurring, wrote a dissenting
opinion in which, disregarding the form of the enactment, they contended that
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"He [the President] had no discretion in the premises except in
respect to the duration of the suspension so ordered. But that related
only to the enforcement of the policy established by Congress."
It would seem, therefore, that the majority opinion in Field v. Clark
is not intended to apply directly to a case of real delegation of dis-
cretion, and as to such a situation it was dictum.
The questions presented by Dowling v. Lancashire Insurance Co.
are;
i. Must a statute contain within itself all the detailed regulations
which it contemplates, or may authority to make such detailed regula-
tions be delegated?
2. May a discretion or choice as to means or method be included in
this authority?
3. May such an act be sustained if it permits or requires the adoption
of a policy or of standards by the delegate depending upon his discre-
tion and judgment?
Of course such regulations are not statutes; a statute is a formal
enactment of the legislature. But our question goes to the substance,
not to the form or name of the enactment, and our inquiry is whether,
and how far, a commission or an executive officer may lay down rules
binding upon the public under the general authority of a statute.
We shall first inquire how far a delegate may be intrusted with the
power of supplying the detailed regulations contemplated by a statute
and in accordance with its policy.
In Atlantic Express Co. v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 8 the act
brought in question denounces excessive charges, unjust discrimina-
tions and preferences as unlawful, and invests the commission with
authority to "make such just and reasonable rules and regulations as
may be necessary for preventing the same." The court says, quoting
with approval from Georgia R. R. v. Smith:3 9
"The difference between the power to pass a law and the power to
adopt rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already passed is
apparent and great; and this we understand to be the distinction
the discretion lodged in the President here to determine when duties were
"reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" and to base such an order upon that
determination, was the very essence of legislative duty. They distinguished the
case of The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch, 388, on the ground that in the latter case the
act of Congress provided for all the contingencies. It should be noted, however,
that if the interpretation of the minority is accepted, the duty of the President
though legislative in nature is still to be exercised in subordination to the policy
of Congress as declared in the act, and so falls within our main thesis.
8 (i8g2) ixi N. C. 463, i6 S. E. 393, 32 Am. St Rep. 8o5, 18 L. R. A. 393.
"(i883) 70 Ga. 694.
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recognized strikingly by all the courts as the true rule in determining
whether or not, in stich cases, a legislative power is granted."
In Blue v. Beach,40 the state board of health was by statute
empowered to adopt
"rules and by-laws, subject to the provisions of this act and in harmony
with other statutes in relation to the public health, to prevent outbreaks
and the spread of contagious and infectious diseases."
Under this act, rule i i of. the board was promulgated. It provided:
"In all cases where an exposure to smallpox is threatened, it shall
be the duty of the board of health, within whose jurisdiction such
exposure shall have occurred, or danger of such an epidemic ensuing,
to compel a vaccination or revaccination of all exposed persons."
Under article 4, section i of the constitution of the state, "All legis-
lative authority" is lodged in the general assembly, and it is claimed
that by virtue of that section of the state constitution the power to
make such a rule may not be delegated to the board of health. The
court sustained the delegation, saying:41
"While it is true that the character or nature of such boards is
administrative only, . . . the power to make reasonable rules, by-
laws, and regulations is generally recognized by the authorities . . .
When these boards duly adopt rules or by-laws by virtue of legislative
authority, such rules and by-laws, within the respective jurisdictions,
have the force and effect of a law of the legislature."
In State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. this language is used :42
"Where a valid statute, complete in itself, enacts the general out-
lines of a governmental scheme, or policy, or purpose, and confers
upon officials charged with the duty of assisting in administering the
law authority to make .. rules and regulations, . . . such
authority is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
A statute may be complete when the subject, the manner, and
the extent of its operation are stated in it."
In Cook v. Burnquist the court says :43
"The Legislature of the state, in passing a law, may include in that
law many administrative details, as well as the main vital provisions
of thelaw, or it may pass a law covering a matter broadly and in gen-
' (1900) 155 Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89, 50 L. R. A. 64, 84 Am. St. Rep. 195.
It is interesting to note-that some of the cases chiefly relied on as sustaining
Dowling v. Laicashire Fire Ins. Co. as authority for the proposition that the
legislative act must be complete in detail and that no discretion can be lodged in
the delegate, are in the case of Bhe v. Beach cited for the opposite result, to
wit, Locke's Appeal. 72 Pa. St. 491, and Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649.
(ig1) 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 3 L. R. A. N. S. 639.
(1917) 242 Fed. 321, 329.
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eral, leaving the administrative details to a board, or to certain
designated persons; but the administrative details of any particular
matter included in a statute still retain their character of administra-
tive details, and the Legislature may pass an act permitting the carry-
ing out of a change of these administrative details to a. public board
or to an individual, even after they have been enacted into the
statute."
44
In Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Dey justice Brewer remarked that 5
"the line of demarkation between legislative and administrative func-
tions is not always easily discerned. The one runs into the other.
The law books are full of statutes unquestionably valid, in which the
legislature has been content to simply establish rules and principles,
leaving execution and details to other officers."
That a statute may be general and that the details necessary to its
policy and purpose may be supplied by a board or an individual, seems
too well settled for further question.
The second question is whether a discretion may be granted to the
mandatary as to means, method, or subject-matter. It would clearly
appear from the decisions that, within the purpose and policy of the
statute, a discretion-broad or narrow as the legislature shall deem
expedient-may be vested in the delegate.4' Further consideration of
"In the more recent case of Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture
(I911) 222 U. S. 380, 56 L. Ed. 240, the delegation was upheld:
"The legislative requirement was that the illuminating oils .. . should be
safe, pure, and afford a satisfactory light, and it was left to the Board of Agri-
culture to determine what oils would measure up to these standards."
"A direct exercise by the legislature of the police power is in accordance with
immemorial governmental usage. But the subject matter may be such that only
a general scheme or policy can with advantage be laid down . . . and the work-
ing out in detail of the policy indicated may be left to the discretion of the
administrative or executive officials." McGhee, Due Process of Law, 366 and
cases cited.
45 (1888) 35 Fed. 866, 874.
'Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board, 222 U. S. 380, supra, note 43; Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470; Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121.
In St. Louis, Iron Mt. & So. R . v. Taylor (19o8) 210 U. S. 281, 287, 52 L. Ed.
io6i, io64, delegation by Congress of the duty to fix the standard height of draw-
bars for freight cars, was held constitutional.
State v. Briggs (1904) 45 Ore. 366, 77 Pac. 750:
"It is sometimes said in opinions and in law books that, where a statute under-
takes to regulate the licensing of callings, trades, or professions, the extent of
the qualifications required of the licensee must be determined by the judgment
of the Legislature; but this does not mean that the Legislature must necessarily
provide in the act itself the exact qualifications required. It may delegate that
power to a board or commission created and authorized by it, which, in the
exercise of the authority vested in it, acts on behalf of the state; its conclusions
and judgments, so long as exercised within the limits of the law, being the acts
of the state, and binding as such."
In State v. Normand (1913) 76 N. H. 541, 85 Atl. 899, 9O1, Ann. Cas. 1913 E,
966, the court says: "The statute is complete in itself. It in effect declares that
bread unnecessarily exposed to flies and dirt is a public menace and provides
a penalty for the infringement . . . of the act . . .The state board of health
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this question may be included under our treatment of the third inquiry:
May a discretion thus granted be so broad as to permit the adoption of
a policy by the delegate?
There are many dicta to the effect that no power to choose policies
may be given to the delegate. But such statements usually accompany
a decision sustaining the delegation complained of but insisting that it
is not a real delegation of legislative functions or powers. To get
clear light, one must ignore phrases and terms and look at the results
attained.
In i9IO, the fourth section of the Interstate Commerce Act was
amended so that"
"upon application to the Interstate Commerce Commission such carrier
may in special cases, after investigation, be authorized by the commis-
sion to charge less for longer than for shorter distances."
The effect of the act was to take from the carrier the right to determine
in the first instance whether conditions were "substantially similar,"
and the right to determine in advance upon the modification of a given
rate where it conflicted with the general provisions of the long and
short-haul clause. The power to make such orders was vested in the
commission. In order to standardize its rulings under this act, the
Interstate Commerce Commission had divided the territory under its
jurisdiction into zones, thus framing a general policy under which its
special rules should be made. It was contended that this gave the
commission too broad a legislative power. The court denied the con-
tention, 1 but it sustained the statute and the action of the commission
upon the rather unsatisfactory ground that since the carrier had for-
merly been permitted t6 fix a rate for itself which depended for its
validity on a consideration of whether circumstances were substan-
tially similar, that had been equally a delegation of legislative power;
and the carriers contending for that power-which would revert to
them if the statute in question were unconstitutional or inoperative-
were in no position to complain of the commission's exercise of the
same power and of its classification by zones, similar to those which
the railways had formerly used by agreement; if one was an illegal
delegation, it followed that the other was also illegal. But it is sub-
mitted that a railroad company does not legislate in making a rate for
its private business and for determining primarily its private profit.
Its act binds only itself and those individuals who enter into relations
with it; it has no power to bind other railroads. The public interest
is charged with the enforcement of the law, and for that purpose it is authorized
'to make all necessary rules and regulations.' . . .When the board of health
made the rule requiring loaves of bread to be wrapped in paper they were not
legislating."
Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat at L. 548.
"Intermountain Rate Cases (914) 234 U. S. 476, 58 L. Ed. 14o8.
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and the duty of the carrier as a public utility are merely limitations on
the private power of the railroad to make its own rates absolute.
Legislation is the making of rules binding generally on others, not
rules for the conduct of one's own business. The effect of the court's
decision is, therefore, to acquiesce in the delegation to the commission
of a broad discretion, with no standards prescribed other than the gen-
eral purposes expressed in the act, and to acquiesce in the assumption
by the commission of a duty to formulate a general policy to guide its
action in the making of future rules and regulations.
Two remarkable acts of the type under discussion are the general
acts authorizing a reorganization of the customs service by the "Presi-
dent.41 By the Act of August 24, 1912, Congress made the following
provision:
"The President is authorized to reorganize the customs service and
cause estimates to be submitted therefor on account of the fiscal year
nineteen hundred and fourteen bringing the total cost of said service
for said fiscal year within a sum not exceeding $ioi5o,ooo.oo . . . ;
in making such reorganization and reduction in expenses he is author-
ized to abolish or consolidate collection districts, ports, and subports of
entry and delivery, to discontinue needless offices and employments, to
reduce excessive rates of compensation below amounts fixed by law or
Executive order, and to do all such other and further things that in his
judgment may be necessary to make such organization effective and
within the limit of cost herein fixed; such reorganization shall
be communicated to Congress at its next regular session and shall con-
stitute . . . until otherwise provided by Congress the permanent
organization of the customs service."
The act of August I, 1914, provides:
Sec. i. "The President is authorized frotfi time to time, as the
exigencies of the service may require, to rearrange, by consolidation or
otherwise, the several customs-collection districts and to discontinue
ports of entry by abolishing the same or establishing others in their
stead: Provided, That the whole number of customs-collection dis-
tricts, ports of entry, or either of them, shall at no time be made to
exceed those now established and authorized except as the same may
hereafter be provided by law: Provided further, That, hereafter, the
collector of customs of each customs-collection district shall be offi-
cially designated by the number of the district for which he is appointed
and not by the name of the port where the headquarters are situated
and the President is authorized from time to time to change the location
of the headquarters in any customs-collection district as the needs of
the service may require: And provided further, That the President
shall, at the beginning of each regular session, submit to Congress a
statements of all acts,. if any, done hereunder and the reason therefor."
These acts were brought about by the almost intolerable condition
of customs districts in the United States, a condition that had from
I"Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37 Stat. at L. 434, and Act of Aug. 1, 1914, 38 Stat. at L.
623.
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year to year been pressed upon the attention of Congress without result.
The system of districts was substantially the same as that formulated
in 1799; many of the 126 districts 1had become unnecessary, while
newer parts of the country were-not served at all.50 The system was
wasteful and extravagant, but detailed congressional action was appar-
ently impossible because of the complexity of the public interests
involved and the many conflicting local interests.
By virtue of the first act, President Taft promulgated and trans-
mitted to Congress on March 3, 1913, his plan of reorganization, 51
making in the state of Maine, for instance, two districts instead of
fourteen, and establishing forty-nine districts for the entire territory
covered in place of the one hundred and twenty-six previously main-
tained. It will be of interest to note that among other changes in
policy and detail put into effect by this plan, a protest fee of $i.oo was
established for each appeal in order to discourage useless and frivolous
litigation.
It is true that underthese statutes there is no unlimited discretion in
the President; but he has some discretion, and it is contemplated that
he shall adopt his own policy for the general purposes named in the
act-to reduce expense and increase efficiency. But his acts there-
under are legislative in nature, and his authority is derived from the
delegation of power to him by Congress.
Another instance of the authority to perform legislative functions
so broad as to imply a duty in the delegate to establish a policy will be
found in the provisions for a government for the Philippine Islands.
The Act of March 2, 19Ol, provides that
"All military, civil and judicial powers necessary to govern the
Philippine Islands . . . shall, until otherwise provided by Congress,
be. vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such man-
ner as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establish-
ment of civil government and for maintaining and protecting the
inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property and religion."52
By the Act of May ii, 19o8:
"That the President is hereby authorized in his discretion to create
by Executive order, and name, a new executive department in the
Philippine government, and to embrace therein such existing bureaus
as he may designate in his order; and in his appointment of any com-
mission member he shall specify in his message to the Senate the
department if any, of which the appointee shall be the secretary."-"
' See U. S. Finance Report (igo6) 34; also testimony of Jas. F. Curtis,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, before the Committee on Expenditures of
Treasury Department, Aug. 16-17, 1911, esp. Report, p. 4.
" Executive order.of March 3, 1913. See also executive orders of President
Wilson under the act of Aug. i, 1914, dated Nov. 21, 1914, and May I5, 1917.
5" 31 Stat. at L. 9Io.
1 Ch. 164, s. 2, 35 Stat. at L. 125.
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It is true that under the Constitution5 '
"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belong-
ing to the United States."
This provision is an authority to legislate, although on the face of it,
it is no more an authority to delegate legislative power to the co-ordi-
nate executive branch of the government than are the provisions of
article i already referred to. The question was raised as to the first
of the above statutes in Dorr v. United States,55 but the Supreme Court
only said in answer to the objection that "The right of Congress to
authorize a temporary government is not open to question at this day
S. ." Of course the power of Congress to legislate for a territory
cannot be denied, nor its power to delegate powers of local self-govern-
ment to a locality or a territory. It is true, also, that the executive
authority may do some things in the control and organization of new
territory that falls into its hands; but none of these considerations
touches the present question: Can Congress give to the President by
delegation legislative power over the territories which he would not
otherwise have? If so, it is additional evidence of our recognition of
the power of Congress to delegate legislative functions, and it is
broader than the dicta of the early cases.
A recognized power to delegate legislative functions, even to the
extent of allowing the delegate to adopt a policy-or rather, as we
hope may appear, requiring the delegate to adopt a policy--will be
found in the cases dealing with the delegation of the rate-making
powers. In Munn v. Illinois" the Court went so far as to declare
that a legislative rate was a matter of policy to be controlled at the
polls rather than in the courts. This sweeping result is not now
deemed to follow the legislative exercise of the rate-making function
but it is concededly a legislative function-a rule for the future bind-
ing upon all to whom it applies.57 May this function be delegated by
the legislature to a commission? In Interstate Commerce Com. v.
Cincinnati etc. Ry. justice Brewer said :18
"There were three obvious and dissimilar courses open for considera-
tion. Congress might itself prescribe the rates; or it might commit
to some subordinate tribunal this duty."
"Article IV, sec. 3, par. 2.
(1904) 195 U S. 153, 49 L. Ed. 128.
(1876) 94 U. S. 113.
" Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. North Car. Corp. Cont. (1907) 2o6 U. S. 1, 27
Sup. Ct 585, 51 L. Ed. 933 and notes; Interstate Commerce Co-n. v. Cincinnati
etc. Ry. (1897) 167 U. S. 479, 42 L. Ed. 243.
o' 167 U. S. 479, 494.
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In Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Garrett it is said:"
"It has frequently been pointed out that prescribing rates for the
future is an act legislative, and not judicial, in kind ... It pertains,
broadly speaking, to the legislative power. The legislature may act
directly, or, in the absence of constitutional restriction, it may commit
the authority to fix rates to a subordinate body."
The Supreme Court has said :0
"The function of rate-maling is purely legislative in its character,
and this is true, whether it is exercised directly by the legislature itself
or by some subordinate or administrative body, to whom the power of
fixing rates in detail has been delegated."
Chief Justice White, in Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. North Car. Corp.
Com. says:"'
"The elementary proposition that railroads from the public nature
of the business by them carried on and the interest which the public
have in their operation are subject, as to their state business, to state
regulation, which may be exerted either directly by the legislative
authority or by administrative bodies endowed with power to that end,
is not and could not be successfully questioned in view of the long line
of authorities sustaining that doctrine."
In State v. Public Serv. Com. the court says :62
"It is also settled beyond doubt or cavil that this power of prescrib-
ing maximum rates for common carriers, which, as we have seen,
Legislatures possess pursuant to an untrammeled grant of powers to
pass laws, may be delegated to a public service commission. To this
rule, unless inhibited by express constitutional provision, there is not
a reputable exception. . . . He reads the cases in vain who does not
concede the authority of the Legislature, absent an express constitu-
tional provision which forbids, to delegate to an administrative body
the power to fix rates for the carriage of freight and passengers."
By the provisions of the Missouri constitution6
"The legislative power, subject to the limitations herein contained,
shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, to be styled
the General Assembly of the state of Missouri." And" "The Gen-
eral Assembly . . . shall from time to time pass laws establishing
reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passen-
gers and freight on said railroads, and enforce all such laws by
adequate penalties."
(I913) 231 U. S. 298, 305, 58 L. Ed. 229, 239.
0Knoxville v. KIAoxville Water Co. (io8) 212 U. S. i, 8, 53 L. Ed. 371,
quoted in San Joaquin Light & P. Corp. v. R. R. Com. (1917) 165 Pac. i6, 17.
12o6 U. S. i, ig.
" (1917, Mo.) 194 S. W. 287, 291, 289, 292, 295.
'Art. 4, sec. i, Constitution of 1875.
"Art. 12, sec. 14.
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
Under these constitutional provisions the legislature had provided
that"
"Whenever the Commission shall be of the opinion . . . that the
maximum rates . . . are insufficient to yield reasonable compensa-
tion for the service rendered,6 . . . the Commission shall . . .
determine the just and reasonable rates, fares and charges to be there-
after observed and in force as the maximum to be charged for the
service to be performed, notwithstanding that a higher rate, fare or
charge has been heretofore authorized by statute.
The court held that in spite of the direct mandate given by article 12,
section 14 of the Missouri constitution to the legislature, the latter body
had properly delegated this function, although the exercise of the sub-
delegated power by the commission involved the setting aside by the
commission of a previously established legislative rate,67 and that the
power of delegation to a commission was the same whether such pro-
visions were in the constitution or not, and that "it is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power to clothe a public service commission
with the power of establishing reasonable rates, maximum or mini-
mum."
68
It is true that, while sustaining the rate-making function bestowed
on a commission by statute, courts have attempted to show that this
function is not legislative but rather judicial in nature. This tendency
I Laws of 1913, sec. 47, p. 583.
o' Notice the qualification on the jurisdiction of the commission: it must first
find that the maximum rate is insufficient to yield reasonable compensation.
This makes it necessary for the commission to find that fact as a prerequisite
to jurisdiction to act as a legislative body. Cf. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v.
Minnesota (i8go) 134 U. S. 418. But it is believed that this fact being found,
the power exercised is as purely legislative as though the statute were unquali-
fied. See Illinois Act of May 2, 1873, sec. 8, which without qualification com-
manded the commission to "make for each railroad . . . a schedule of reason-
able rates." This statute was upheld in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Jones (1894)
149 Ill. 361, 376, 37 N. E. 247.
' The Missouri court points out, however, that the state legislature is not
dependent upon art. 12, sec. 14 for its power over rates.
"Since . . . the Legislature of this state had and exercised the power to
establish reasonable maximum rates of carriage for freight and passengers,
long before section 14 of article 12 was ever written into our Constitution, the
latter section of the Constitution was merely the expression of a theretofore
existing constitutional power . . . and so the cases which come from states
having no express provision as to the legislative authority over railroads, and
which hold constitutional the delegation of this power, are just as cogent, bind-
ing and persuasive as cases from Illinois, West Virginia, Alabama, Washing-
ton, and Georgia, which have constitutional provisions similar to our own."
'For decisions in other states under similar provisions see Chicago, B. & Q.
R. R. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 376. Also State v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. (r915) 76
W. Va. 399, 75 S. E. 714, 717, where under similar constitutional provisions the
commission was authorized to "change any intrastate rate, charge or toll, which
is unjust or unreasonable, and may prescribe such rate, charge or toll as would
be just and reasonable. . . ." This was held to be not unconstitutional as
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is more likely to appear where the statute conferring the legislative
duty couples with it as a prerequisite the duty of first ascertaining
whether the rates previously in effect are unreasonable, and makes
that finding a condition precedent to the exercise of the legislative
function of establishing new rates. Here the commission has two
functions to perform: one judicial in nature, in determining the juris-
dictional fact of pre-existing unreasonable rates; the other legislative,
in the establishment of the new rates; but the tendency has been to
consider the two functions as one. Thus the Wisconsin court in
Minneapolis, St. P. etc. Ry. v. Railroad Com.6 9 speaks of the power of
the legislature to delegate to the commission the power of making rates
under chapter 362, section 14, of the laws of i9o5, providing in sub-
stance that whenever the commission shall find any existing rate unrea-
sonable or unjustly discriminatory, it shall fix a reasonable rate to be
followed in the future.
The court says:
"This law establishes, and thenceforth assumes, the existence of
rates . . . discoverable by investigation, but undisclosed, which are
exactly reasonable and just. It commits to the Railroad Commission
the duty to ascertain and disclose that particular rate. . . . The law
intends that there is only one rate . . . that is reasonable and just.
When the order of the commission is set aside by the court, it is
because this reasonable and just rate . . . has not yet been correctly
ascertained. When the order of the commission has been rescinded
or changed by the commission because of changed conditions, it is
because there is a new reasonable rate to be ascertained and disclosed,
applicable to such new conditions and fixed by force of law immediately
when the new conditions come into existence. But the theory and man-
date of the law is that this point always exists under any combination
of conditions and is always discoverable, although not always dis-
covered. Until it is discovered and made known the former rates and
service prevail. . . . If it were conceded that the commission had
power or discretion to fix one of several rates, either of which would
be just and reasonable, it would be hard to say that this was not a
delegating legislative power expressly conferred on the legislature by the con-
stitution.
See also State v. Railroad Coin. (1909) 52 Wash. 33, IOO Pac. 184, sustaining
a Washington statute under similar circumstances.
Art. 4, sec. 2, par. i of the Georgia constitution provided that:
"The power and authority of . . . requiring reasonable and just rates of
freight and passenger tariffs, are hereby conferred upon the General Assembly,
whose duty it shall be to pass laws, from time to time, to regulate freight and
passenger tariffs." Under this iirovision the legislature provided that the com-
mission should "make reasonable and just rates of freight and passenger tariffs,
to be observed by all. railroad companies doing business in this state on the
railroads thereof." Code 1882, par. 719, p. 159.
The court in Georgia R. R. v. Smith (1883) 7o Ga. 694, 698, sustained the
delegation because of the "utter impossibility of preparing by the legislature
just and proper schedules for the various railroads." See also Railroad Com. v.
Central of Ga. Ry. (1909) 17o Fed. 225, 238, construing the Alabama constitution.
' 09o8) 136 Wisc. 146, 116 N. W. 905, 911, 912, 17 L. R. A. N. S. 821.
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delegation of pure legislative power to the commission. But the theory
of this law is to delegate to the commission the power to ascertain
facts and to make mere administrative regulations."
Note the statement of the court that the delegation in question is per-
missible only if one concedes that a reasonable rate is a fixed. point to
be found by the commission as a fact previously existing, and that if
the latter had "power or discretion to fix one of several rates, either
of which would be just and reasonable, it would be hard to say that this
was not a delegation of pure legislative power."
Yet it is submitted that what may be a reasonable rate is not a fixed
point. The court admits this for practical purposes, for it proceeds
to say:
"In reviewing the order of the Railroad Commission the inquiry is
not whether the rate . . . fixed by the commission is just and
reasonable, but whether the order of the commission is unreasonable
or unlawful. . . . The court is not investigating for the purpose of
establishing a fixed point. Whether or not the order is within the field
of reasonableness, or outside its boundaries, is the question for the
court. . . . The order, being found by the court to be such that
reasonable men might well differ with respect to its correctness, cannot
be said to be unreasonable.'"
Of course what the court had in mind in the last quotation is the
relation of the functions of the court and the commission, and the
court treats it as somewhat like the relation of court and jury. But it
should be recognized that a reasonable rate is not, even in theory, a
fixed point, but is any point in that portion of a scale of possible rates
between the point of unreasonable cost to the public on the one hand
and of confiscation of, the property of the utility on the other; and that
even the location of this portion of the entire scale will vary according
to the basis taken for valuation and proper return.70  That the duty
of fixing the rate implies a broad discretion and a duty to establish a
O""The thing of real importance in a rate case is not the fair value of the
property alone or the fair rate of return alone, but the product of the two."
Report, p. 146, of committee on plans for ascertaining the fair value of railroad,property submitted to 23d Annual Convention, National Association of Railroad
Commissioners.
"What is the test by which the reasonableness of rates is determined? This
is not yet fully settled. Indeed, it is doubtful whether any single rule can belaid down, applicable to all the cases." Judge Brewer in Ames v. Union Pac.
R. R. (1894) 64 Fed. 165, 177."Little progress has been made toward a definition of 'fair value for rate
purposes.' Some authorities state that the term is not subject to definition, if
by definition is meant the laying down of a standard or rule or formula by which
fair value can be determined. Each case must be considered on its own merits."
Whitten, Valuation of Public Service Corporations (1914) Supp. 817.
Fair value "is a determination of what, under all the facts and circumstances
of the case is a just and equitable amount on which the return allowed to the
corporation is to be computed." Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352.
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policy is well brought out in the case of re Portland Railway, Light &
Power Co.."
"In the consideration of any case . . . this commission will be
governed by considerations of public policy, bearing in mind the con-
stant need for the investment of new capital in order that the public
may be properly served . . . the effect upon investors of a given
action in rate regulation is not confined to the particular class of
utility in which it is exercised."
And it seems well settled that whether rates are fixed by a commission
or by the legislature directly, the courts will use the same cohsidera-
tion in dealing with thenA. They will not declare them confiscatory
unless there is a clear case. Thus in Louiville & N. R. R. v. Garrett,
justice Hughes says :72
"The rate-making power necessarily implies a range of legislative
discretion; and, so long as the legislative action is within the proper
sphere, the courts are not entitled to interpose and upon their own
investigation of traffic conditions and transportation problems to sub-
stitute their judgment with respect to the reasonableness of rates for
that of the legislature or of the railroad commission exercising its
delegated power."
Another court puts it thus :73
"The vital question to both shipper and carrier being that the rates
shall be reasonable, and not by what body they shall be put in force."
In Bluefield v. Bluefield Water Co.."
"The valuation of the property of a public service corporation for
rate making purposes and the fixing of rates for tolls and charges for
the services to be rendered are purely legislative acts and are not the
subject of judicial inquiry, except in so far and in so far only as may
be necessary to determine whether such rates are void on constitutional
or other grounds."'75
We must conclude that the making of rates, whether by the legisla-
ture or by a commission, is a legislative function, that it is delegable
to the commission, that it involves the exercise of a broad discretion
and the adoption of a policy by the commission, and that no standards
need be set for the commission other than the implied standard that
the rates shall be not confiscatory on the utility nor oppressive to the
public. Even as to these bounds no definite point can be fixed and the
7(P. S. C. Ore.) P. U. R. I918 B, 266, 275.
(1913) 231 U. S. 298, 313, 58 L. Ed. 229, 242.
r'State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. (i9o8) 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R.
A. N. S. 639.
7' 94 S. E. 121, 122, P. U. R. i918 B, 25.
76 Cf. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Dey (i888) 35 Fed. 866; Des Moines Gas Co.
v. Des Moines (1915) 238 U. S. i53, 59 L. Ed. 1244.
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decision rests with the rate-making body subject to be set aside when
the power granted is not exercised within the terms of the grant, or
when the result is clearly confiscatory or is a clear invasion of the
right of the public to a rate that is not oppressive.7 6
Another class of cases in which the courts have apparently attempted
to explain away clear delegations of legislative functions and to attrib-
ute the result attained to other grounds is in those instances where
commissions are authorized to prescribe in advance demurrage and
other charges. Some courts have seemed to imply that since this is
fixing an element of civil damage for cases that may arise, it is like
jury action and hence is not legislative. In State v. Public Service
Com. the court says:17
"There is the same distinction between prescribing such compensa-
tion and fixing a penalty in its nature purely punitive as there is
between the fixing of reasonable rates and the prescribing of such
penalties. Both the fixing of reasonable rates and the fixing of reason-
able demurrage for the failure to furnish cars in their nature involve
the determination of the question of reasonable compensation."
The inference apparently intended to be conveyed in this and similar
cases is that the act of designating a reasonable compensation is not
legislative but it is akin rather to a judicial determination or a finding
of fact by a jury. But this is not true: the distinction between a
legislative and a judicial act is not that in the latter a remedy is applied
while in the former it is rather a penalty; the true distinction lies in
the fact that in legislation there is created a new general rule for future
cases binding upon all to whom the rule applies, while in judicial acts
the thing done is to ascertain the actual past damage in connection with
a case before the tribunal. By this test, the fixing of damages or of
rates of demurrage in advance is a legislative act; it is no less so
when done by a commission than when done by a legislature. It
would seem, therefore, that in spite of the dicta in the case last quoted,
it makes no difference whether the delegation is of the authority to
make a general rule inflicting penalties, or is intended to cover future
cases for compensatory damages; the act required in either case is
legislative, and if there is any distinction it should be sought on other
grounds.
In the case of Ex parte Kollock the court says :78
"We agree that the courts of the United States, in determining what
constitutes an offense against the United States, must resort to the
statutes of the United States, enacted in pursuance of the Constitution."
"Beale & Wyman, Railroad Rate Regulation, sec. 442, 445.
"(917) 162 Pac. 523, 526. Cf. Chippewa & F. Itnpiovement Co. v. Railroad
Cam. (1916) i59 N. W. 739; Southern Ry. v. Melton (19o9) I33 Ga. 277, 65
S. E. 665.
78 (1897) i65 U. S. 526, 533, 41 L. Ed. 813, 815.
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In United States v. Maid the court puts it thus :9
"A department regulation may have the force of law in a civil suit
to determine property rights, . . . and yet be ineffectual as the basis
of a criminal prosecution. . . .
"The obvious ground of said distinction is that to make an act a
criminal offense is essentially an exercise of legislative power, which
cannot be delegated, while the prescribing . . . of a rule, without
penal sanctions, to carry into effect what congress has enacted,
although such rule may be as efficacious and binding as though it were
a public law, is not a legislative, but ministerial, function."
It is submitted that any "function" which can create a "rule bind-
ing as though it were a public law" for all future cases as they arise
is legislative and that it is not ministerial in any proper sense of that
term. Departmental regulations for the conservation of the national
domain s or for the protection of dairy interests against unlabeled
oleomargarine8' are regulations calling for a wide discretion to be
exercised by the delegate. In United States v. Eaton this language is
used :82
"It would be a very dangerous principle to hold that a thing pre-
scribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . . could be con-
sidered as a thing 'required by law' . . . in such manner as to
become a criminal offence under § i of the act .... If Congress
intended to make it an offence, . . . it would have done so dis-
tinctly."" '
Reading between the lines, the real ground of distinction between cases
where the commission attempts under delegated authority to impose a
penalty and those in which it fixes a rule of damages for-the future,
would appear to be that the determination of the policy being the
essential of the legislative act, the courts will look to the authorizing
act of Congress or the legislature for that policy; and that wliile the
intention to standardize damages might readily be assumed,
84 yet the
court will not presume the intended policy of allowing the commission
or delegate to inflict a penalty or create a new crime in- any case;
therefore the authority to do that must at least be clearly expressed in
the statute. But if so expressed, it may authorize the making of rules
by administrative agencies which when made will be binding as law
and their violation a crime. In other words, the inflicting of penalties
and the creating of crimes is so much a matter of policy as to be what
(19o2) 116 Fed. 65o, 652.
' Grmaud v. U. S. (1911) 220 U. S. 5o6.
Ex parte Kollock, 165 U. S. 526.
(1892) 144 U. S. 677,' 688, 12 Sup. Ct. 764, 36 L. Ed. 591.
Cf. U. S. v. Bailey (1835) 9 Peters, 238, 9 L. Ed. 113; and Oceanic Steam
Nay. Co. v. Stranahan (9o9) 214 U. S. 320, 29 Sup. Ct 671, 53 L. Ed. 1013.
" Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, supra, n. 82.
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is sometimes called an "essentially legislative" or "purely legislative
act." 18 5 But it is believed that even the above cases are not necessarily
binding as precedents for the proposition that commissions may under
no circumstances be allowed to fix penalties or name offences if
definitely authorized by statute to do so: the cases cited go rather on
the theory that such authority will not be presumed. On the other hand
the cases seem to indicate so strong a tendency on the part of the
courts jealously to watch delegations of policy-forming functions by
the legislature when they conflict with "individual or property rights,"
that this result is doubtful. One reason is that such delegations of
power are unnecessary. Few cases can be conceived in which the
delegation of such functions was necessary; but if the necessity ever
becomes apparent it is not doubted that the power will be conceded to
exist unless the question has been definitely closed by precedent.
In this connection attention may be called to a class of cases arising
under state constitutions which reserve no legislative power in the
people. The legislature in such cases may attempt to refer back some
legislative act to the people for their ratification, making a favorable
popular vote the condition precedent to the operation of the act.
There are two groups of cases upon this point, one declaring such
reference unwarranted as a delegation of legislative power to the
majority,8 and the other allowing it as the mere naming of a condition
precedent upon which the law will become effective-an external act
or happening which the legislature itself makes the condition of the
law's operation. 7
On principle, if the mandate to the legislature requires it to declare
the policies of the state, the legislature should not shirk its duty by
attempting to throw back upon the public the responsibility for the
policy. 8  It was ingeniously suggested- by Justice Redfield in State v.
Parker:"9
"And in regard to those great moral, social, and economic reforms,
can it be doubted that the question of the preparation of the public
mind to sustain them, firmly and quietly, lies at the foundation of all
hopeful legislation on the subject? And is this not precisely what
American legislatures both state and national have always, in effect,
although not in form, been accustomed to do?"
See post, notes 92 to 94.
'In re Municipal Suffrage to Women (1894) 16o Mass. 386, 36 N. E. 488, 23
L. R. A. 113; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.) 168 et seq.; People v.
Kennedy (1913) 2o7 N. Y. 533, IOI N. E. 442.
'Hudspeth v. Swayze (1914) 85 N. L. J. 592, 89 Atl. 78o; State v. Parker
(1854) 26 Vt 357. See also Smith v. Janesville (1870) 26 Wisc. 291.
'Cf. dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in In re Municipal Suffrage, 16o
Mass. 386, 36 N. E. 488, 491, with Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.)
168 et seq.-note 86, supra.
826 Vt 357, 364.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
It may be true that laws should be only those which the popular
mind is ready to receive and that the enforcement of laws depends
upon their appeal to the sentiment of the people at large; but this con-
sideration should be addressed toward an amendment to the constitu-
tion if it is believed that the will of the people can be found only by
a referendum. It should not be permitted to override a mandate
expressed or strongly implied in the constitution requiring the legis-
lature to take personal responsibility for all state policies formulated
into statutes.
It may be objected that the line should be more sharply drawn, that
we should either forbid all delegation of legislative functions, or else
go to the other extreme and, forbid nothing less than the surrender
of the final and ultimate power itself. But it is believed that such a
line need not be drawn and that the duty of Congress and of the legis-
latures will in this respect always be relative to the subject, to the
emergency, and to the public needs-more, probably, in the future
than in the past; more in war times than in times of peace. The
question is what is reasonably necessary in view of what the times
demand and of the end to be accomplished.
0 The result may be that
legislation for every-day purposes will increasingly be by rules and
regulations, and that statutes will be limited to a position of mere
policy-directing instruments. Statutes may bear a relation to the rules
and regulations of the future somewhat analogous to that which con-
stitutions have heretofore borne to statutes. It is true that such
methods will be earlier used in cases where expertness and special
knowledge are needed, or where the subject-matter is vastly com-
plicated; but, within the limits indicated, it remains a potential means
of practical legislation for broader fields.
Something might be said at thig point on the use of terms by the
courts in the classes of cases under consideration. It would appear
that the courts classify these cases in which power is delegated after
the court has decided to sustain or reject it, and the terms applied
therefore become a sort of ex post facto justification or prohibition,
according as the thing is deemed necessary or not. The fact that so
many classes of permitted delegations of a power legislative in its
nature have occurred shows the existence of a power to make such
delegation which is gradually recognized as the necessity becomes
apparent. The term "ministerial" has been used
91 to describe an act
really discretionary in nature, but so used as to disguise the true nature
of the permitted act. The terms "strictly and essentially" or "strictly
'See Professor Frankfurter, Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes
(1916) 29 HAv. L. REv. 683, 686-688.
'Douglas Park Jockey Club v. Talbott (917) 191 S. W. 474; U. S. v, Maid
(I9O2) II6 Fed. 65o.
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and exclusively legislative acts; ' ' 92 "purely legislative power;"' 93
or "purely legislative duties ;" or "legislation in the broad sense"' 9 -
have all been used in the sense of the legislative policy control as dis-
tinguished from subordinate acts of a legislative character, or ultimate
legislative discretion as contrasted with the act which declares the new
rule. We also have the much-abused term "administrative powers
and duties," which as applied to functions of a legislature nature
seems to mean only "those legislative functions and powers which may
be delegated." For the purposes of our discussion, the expression is
a question-begging term more or less elastic in content.9 6
Let us disregard the terms used and consider the thing done.
Several propositions must then be conceded: No rule against the
delegation of legislative powers by the legislature or by Congress 7
within the scope of the subjects committed to it, prevents the delega-
tion upon the executive department or upon specially created boards
,r commissions through general statutes of the power and duty to per-
form functions legislative in their nature. This delegated power may
be so broad as to require the use of a broad discretion and to necessitate
the adoption of policies by the delegate. While the power may be
exercised only within the limits designated by the legislature, yet it is
for the legislature to say how broad the limits shall be, and in this
determination they are guided by their honest judgment as to the most
efficient means of serving the public. The courts should not review
the discretion of the legislature in this respect, but should interfere
only in plain cases of an attempted abdication of the function of
choosing policies, or because of arbitrary interference with matters of
private right.98 In construing the rules laid down by a subordinate
functionary under this power, the courts should treat their acts as valid
if within the lines of the authority committed to them and not clearly
Lumpkin, J., in Southern Ry. v. Melton, 65 S. E. 665.
'Interstate Commerce Com. v. Goodrich Trans. Co. (i912) 224 U. S. 194,
214, 56 L. Ed. 729, 737.
" State v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 99 N. W. 636, quoted in Alexander v. Mclnnis
(1915) 129 Minn. 165, 167, 151 N. W. 899, 9o.
Cook v. Burnquist (I917) 242 Fed. 321, 329.
"State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. (1911) 56 Fla. 6x7, supra, note 34.
While Congress has only granted legislative powers and there is not the
same presumption in favor of its power as is indulged in the case of a state
legislature, yet it is believed that the power of Congress to delegate, within the
field of legislation committed to it, must be unquestioned in view of the pro-
visions of the federal Constitution quoted supra, and the construction placed
upon them by the courts. See cases mentioned in notes 14, 19, 23, 46, 48, 55, 58
supra.
I"The Constitution should be interpreted so as not to render impotent or
inoperative, but to preserve and make effective, the sovereign power of the
state. . . . If the details of the general legislative purpose, within definite
limitations, as expressed in a complete law, cannot be committed to administra-
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against some constitutional inhibition. Of the wisdom or expediency
of the subordinate policy contained in these rules the court should not
judge."9
Judicial reference has been made to the general tendency.:
100
"The marked tendency of legislation in recent years, not only in this
state, but in other states, has been, to a large degree, to break away
from the theory of three separate and independent departments of
government, by imposing upon other departments duties and powers
of a legislative character, which the courts have been inclined to
sustain."
And in Cook v. Burnquist:'01
"The tendency, not only in Congress, but in state Legislatures, is
more and more to commit to administrative boards, or to individuals,
or to some other branch of the government, administrative details."
Indeed the whole tendency of the cases has been toward a general
readjustment of the relations of courts and legislatures; toward a
greater inclination to concede to the latter freer lines as to policies;
and toward noninterference on the part of the courts whenever politi-
cal ideas are the moving considerations. 10 2  Perhaps we are realizing
more clearly that governmental problems, even under our written con-
tive officers, the sovereign power and duty to regulate would be impotent"
State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. (igo8) 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R. A. N. S.
639, 659.
"As a general proposition, whatever laws or regulations are necessary to
protect the public health and secure public comfort is a legislative question, and
appropriate measures intended and calculated to accomplish these ends are not
subject to judicial review. But nevertheless such measures or means must bear
some relation to the end in view." Blue v. Beach (igoo) 155 Ind. 2I, 56 N. E.
89, 93.
For a case where the court tries to settle the question of the power to delegate
by substituting its own judgment as to policy for that of the legislature, see
Schaerlein v. Cabaniss (Igo2) 135 Cal. 466, 67 Pac. 755. The court quotes the
following from Yick Wo v. Hopkins (i886) ii8 U. S. 356:
"The very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means
of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails,
as being the essence of slavery itself."
""The appropriate questions for the court would be whether the commission
acted within the authority duly conferred by the legislature, and also, so far as
the amount of compensation permitted by the prescribed rates is concerned,
whether the commission went beyond the domain of the state's legislative power
and violated the constitutional rights of property by imposing confiscatory
requirements." Louisville & N. R. R. v. Garrett (913) 231 U. S. 298, 313, 58
L. Ed. 229, 243.
State v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176,. 99 N. W. 636, 637. See note 26, supra,
and 6 A. & E. Ency. Law (2d ed.) io2.
I242 Fed. 321, 325.
0That the federal courts have in the past unconsciously tended to decide
questions of power in reference to departures in legislation, upon political rather
than on purely legal considerations, see Professor Freund, Principles of Legisla-
tion (i916) io Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. i, i4.
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stitutions, must be settled as questions of policy and expediency before
they are finally laid to rest. The settled theory of our fathers that
this shall be a government of laws and not of. men cannot well be
applied as a limitation upon the processes of the lawmaldng and policy-
declaring brand of the government in the same way that it can be
applied to functions judicial in nature.
Our present inquiry is not what policy the legislature should adopt
in the matter of delegation. That is a problem for political wisdom to
determine, and it will always be largely affected by contemporaneous
social and political views. The time will probably come when the
legislature will go too far; the time has surely been when it did not
go far enough. We are here concerned only with the question of
power. It may be urged that it is wrong to agitate these problems
anew solely in the light of present conditions and of political ideals
which often greatly vary from those of our ancestors. But it is
equally inadvisable to settle these problems by dicta of the past which
in their turn were based upon theories now somewhat outworn and
outgrown.
Perhaps we have grown too rapidly and are now at that stage in the
development of a world nation where the sane and conservative views
of our fathers have too little weight. But these are matters of political
judgment, and if our times are wrong, the wrong will be righted later.
The chief thing to remember is that our Constitution is capable of
adaptation to new ideals as well as to new conditions, and that to realize
this is to pay it the highest possible tribute. We must enter upon our
new undertalings with full sense of the fallibility of all things human,
and with a proper reverence for the wisdom of the past.
